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SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.1
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLANID.
2
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.4
ACTION.
The People as a suitor in the Courts- Who may appear.-The
State can be recognized by the courts as a suitor in legal proceed-
ings only through the agents or legal representatives appointed
by law, and the appearance of the proper representative can only
be attested by the record. In a case before a Justice of the Peace
under § 5122 of the Compiled Laws, the intervention of the
Supervisor of the township is necessary, or that of the Prosecu-
ting Attorney of the county. The State can only be made plain-
tiff in error in this Court by the Attorney General: The People
v. Navarre, 22 Mich.
ADVANCEMENT.-See Evidence.
What is.-In 1833, a father, by deed of warranty, conveyed to
his son. certain land of the full value of five hundred dollars, re-
ceiving back a writing therein acknowledging the receipt from his
father of five hundred dollars as the full share of all his father's
estate, and relinquishing all his right, title and interest in and
under his father's e~tate at the latter's decease, which he should
otherwise have had. The father, in April, and the son in the
following November, died intestate. In a real action, brought by
the children and sole heirs of the son, to recover their distributive
share of their grandfather's estate, Held, that the conveyance was
an advancement in full to the son, and that the grandchildren
were barred: Smith v. Smith, 59 Me.
AGREEMENT.
After a settlement between the parties, and the giving of a note
by the defendants to the plaintiffs for a. sum agreed upon, but
. during the same interview, the defendants agreed that in case a
certain shipment of lumber, made by' them, which had not yet
* arrived, should prove on arrival to contain less than 149,013 feet,
at which amount it had been invoiced, the defendants would make
good the deficiency. Held, that this agreement, being subsequent
to, was not merged in, the settlement; and that an action would
lie upon it to recover the amount of deficiency in the *quantity
of lumber shipped: Smith et al. v. Holland, 61 Barb.
1 From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter to appear in 59 Maine Reports.
2 rom J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 35 Maryland Reports.
a From EL K. Clarke, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 22 Michigan Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in 61 and.62 of his Reports.
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Held, also, that the agreement to make good any deficiency in
the quantity of ]umber was upon a good consideration: Id.
How proved.-An oral agreement, connected with a contract in
writing, may be proved by parol, if subsequent and independent:
Id.
AMENDMENT.
Variance.-Afterjudgment, a variance between the complaint
and the proof is immaterial. The court may, on appeal, order an
amendment, so as to conform the allegations of the complaint to
the evidence: Smith et al. v. Holland, 61 Barb.
ARBITRATION.
Submission-Award-Pleading.-The claim to be investigated
by arbitrators need not be stated and annexed to a submission at
common law: Dodge v. Hull and others, 59 Me.
A count in common form upon a submission and award is not
vitiated by allegations in the same count setting up a lien claim;
but the lien claim being waived, the allegations relating thereto
may be rejected as surplusage: Id.
The delivery to the parties by the arbitrators of a paper, not as
their award but as a detailed statement of their conclusions, does
not terminate the powers of the arbitrators; but a formal award
subsequently made and published, wherein the same net balance
is found, is binding: Id.
ATTACHMENT.
Plaintifs right to.-Although an attachment is an extraordi-
nary remedy not known to the common law, and therefore one
which the courts should watch with scrupulous jealousy, yet
when a creditor fairly brings himself, by his application, within the
spirit and the intent of the statute authorizing the remedy, he is
to be protected in the enjoyment of its advantages: Bowles et al.
v. Hoare 61 Barb.
Motion to discharge ; when it may be made.-The provision in
Section 241 of the Code, as amended in 1857, that "in all eases
the defendant may move to discharge the attachment, as in the case
of other provisional remedies," include all cases, such as want of
jurisdiction in the officer who issued the attachment; fraud in
obtaining it; defective papers, and various others: Id.
An application to discharge or vacate an attachment may now
be made in furtherance of justice upon the real merits of the mo-
tion, or for irregularity, or for want of jurisdiction in the officer
who granted it, or for any other cause; and such motion may be
made after judgment entered in the action, even though the de-
fendant has appeared and given the undertaking required by
§§ 240, 241: Id.
Affidavits upon motion.-In cases where the defendant moves,
upon his own affidavit, or affidavits made on his behalf, the plain-
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tiff may oppose the motion, as in other cases, by affidavits which
either explain or contradict those offered by the moving party:
Id.
BILLs OF EXCHANGE.
Acceptance admits genuineness.-The acceptance, whether
general or for honor, or supra protest, after sight, of a bill of ex-
change, admits the genuineness of the signature of the drawer,
and, consequently, in favor of a bona fide holder for value with-
out notice, if the signature turns out to be a forgery, the accept-
ance will nevertheless be binding and entitle such holder to re-
cover thereon according to its tenor: The Salt Springs Bank v.
The Syracuse Savings Institution. 62 Barb.
Forged bill or check; payment by drawee.-If the drawee of a
forged bill has paid it he cannot recover back the money, although
the forgery is conclusively established. Having by that act ad-
mitted its genuineness he will not be permitted to dispute it after-
ward, although he can have no recourse against the drawer for
reimbursement: Id.
Thus, where a forged check upon the plaintiff's bank was re-
ceived by the defendant in the course of its business in good faith,
it having paid the full amount named therein, without notice of
the forgery, and the plaintiff, on presentment of such check by the
defendant; received and paid -it. -Held, that these facts brought
the case within the above rules; and that the plaintiff could not
recover back from the defendant the sum paid upon the check: Id.
Held, also, that the fact that the forged check had upon its face
the forged signature of the plaintiff's teller, which was'overlooked
at the time of the presentment, together with the facts that the
pretended drawer was not even a customer of the bank, and had
no account there out of which the check could be paid, demon-
strated what would otherwise have been a matter of inference
merely, viz., that the plaintiff's agents were guilty of very great
negligence: Id.
A check on a bank is, in substance, a bill of exchange payable
on demand, and is governed by the same rules Which are applica-
ble to those securities: Id.
The officers of a bank are bound to know whether the preteided
drawer of a cheek is oris not a customdr of the bank; and whether
his account will justify the payment of the cheek: Id.
CHECK.-See Bills of.Exchange.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Trial by Jury.-Justices' Courts.-The amendment of section
53 of the Code, in 1861, by extending the jurisdiction of justi-
ces of the peace to actions of replevin, is not void as violating
the provision of the constitution which declares that " the trial
by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore used, shall
remain inviolate forever" (Art. 1, 32), by reason of the circum-
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stance that it transfers a class of cases from courts of record,
where juries are composed of 12 men, to justices' courts, in which
they consist of six, only. MULLIN, P. J., dissenting: Knight v.
CampbelL62 Barb.
That provision in the constitution has no reference to the power
of the legislature to alter and increase the jurisdiction of jus-
tices' courts, and was not intended to, and did not, operate as a
limitation upon such power in that regard: Id.
The constitution, in guarantying the right of "trial by jury
it has been heretofore used," intended to embrace juries in justices'
courts, as they existed, and had been before the constitution was
adopted: Id.
The word "jury," as used in the constitution, does not mean a
jury of twelve men, exclusively. A jury of six men, in ajustice's
court, is as much a jury, in the eye of the law, as ajury of twelve
men, in a court of record, and is the jury which had been "hereto-
fore used" in that tribunal, at the adoption of the constitution:
Id.
CONTRACT.
Validity.- Violation of Public Policy-A complaint alleged
that the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement in
writing, by which the former agreed that she would do all in her
power to aid in a marriage between one R. and the defendant;
in consideration whereof the defendant promised that in case she
became the wife of R. and outlived him she would pay the plain-
tiff, for her services in the matter, $2,000 in cash, etc. The com-
plaint further alleged that R. was a widower, possessing great
wealth; that the plaintiff performed the agreement on her part,
and that, on, etc., R. and the defendant were lawfully married,
and lived together happily for many years, until, etc., when R.
died, leaving the defendant $50,000. Demand of performance, and
refusal by the defendant, were then alleged. Held, 1. That the
plaintiff was properly non-suited, on the ground that the agree-
ment was a marriage brokage contract,, and therefore void as
being against public policy. 2. That the agreement being void,
the claim for advances of money and services performed under it
must fall with the agreement itself: Crawford v. Bussell, 62
Barb.
CovENANT-See Evidence.
Cn~i~rNAL LAW.
Competency of wife as witness against her husband.-A wife
is a competent witness against her husband, or against him and
another person jointly, in the trial of an indictment for using an
instrument with intent to procure her miscarriage while pregnant
with child: State of Maine v. Dyer 59 Me.
DAMAGEs.-See Trespass.
DEED.-See Evidence.
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EJ1ETMENT.
Election of remedies--Ejectment--Parlition.-The action of
ejectment for the trial of the legal title and obtaining possession,
when wrongfully withheld, whether of a whole or an undivided
portion, and a bill in equity for the partition of lands held by
tenants in common, and joint tenants, asprovided by the statutes
of this State, are not elective remedies, applicable generally to
the same state of facts, and to be adopted by parties at their
option. Purely legal titles are to be tried at law, where a jury is a
matter of right, unless there be some impediment to such trial
which requires the aid of'a court of equity to remove. When
the complainant is not in possession, and the case shows an
ouster and an adverse possession, and the legal title is not clear
and beyond suspicion, the appropriate remedy for the trial of the
title, and the obtaining of possession is by the action of eject-
ment, and not by a bill in equity for a partition: Hoffman v.
Beard, 22 Mich.
ESTOPPErL.
Mortgage on real estate-action--declarations of beneficiary
admissible.-If the only surviving beneficiary named id a
mortgage of real estate actively aid and assist the mortgagor in
selling and conveying by deed of warranty the mortgaged
premises to a third person without mentioning her own claim,
and such third person, relying upon the joint representations'of
the mortgagor and such beneficiary, and without suspecting that
there was any incumbrance upon the premises, thereupon pur-
chased the same for their full value, she is thereby estopped to
set up any claim under the mortgage: Bigelow, administrator,
v. Foss, 59 Me.
Nor can such estoppel be avoided by the fact that the plaintiff
of record is prosecuting the suit as the administrator of the estate
of the mortgagor, who stood in the relation of trustee of the
other beneficiary: Id.
The declarations of the real party in interest, though his name
does not appear as the party of record, are competent evidence
against him: Id.
Thus, inthe trial of a real action, brought for the sole purpose
of enforcing a claim for the life-maintenance of the surviving
widow of the mortgagee, in the name 6f the administrator of the
mortgagor, on a mortgage conditioned for the maintenance of
the mortgagee and his wife, her acts and declarations tending to
show that, at the time of the mortgagor's conveyance of the
mortgaged premises by deed of warranty to the defendant's
grantor since the death of her husband, she knew the sale was
contemplated, and actively aided and assisted in bringing about
the sale of the premises at their full value, and urged the
mortgagor's grantee to purchase without mentioning her claim,
and relying upon the joint representations of the mortgagor and
the widow, he did purchase without suspecting there was any
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incumbrance upon the premises. Held, that the facts constitute
a defense, and that they are admissible in evidence: Id.
E VIDENCE.
Deed-Breach of Coveenat- Fariance-Description.-TIn an
action for a breach of covenant contained in a deed for the con-
veyance of land, alleged in the declaration to be made by the
detendant, in which "the said defendant did covenant, grant, bar-
gain and agree for themselves and their heirs" "that they were
well seized," etc., a deed executed by the debndant and his wife
-it appearing that the land was not the individual property of
the wife-is admissible; and this, notwithstanding the covenant
of seizin is stated in the plural: flocey v. Smith, 22 Mich.
Nor is it any objection to the admission of a deed as evidence
in such an action, that the description of the premises is not in the
same words as laid in the declaration. The identity of the pre-
misesmay be shown by other evidence: Id.
Covenant-Deed-Additional consideration proven by larol.-
In the trial of an action of covenant broken by the grantee against
the grantor of real estate, to recover the amount of an outstanding
tax which the former was compelled to pay to prevent a sale of
the premise-. it is competent for the grantor to prove that prior
to and at the time of the conveyance, the grantee verbally agreed
to pay the tax: Dearborn v. Morse, 59 Me.
Declarations of a Grantor.-Although the declarations of a
grantor, accompanying the conveyance of real estate to his sons,
or accompanying the giving of personal property to them, are
competent evidence as res gestae, on the question whether such
real estate or personal property were advancements, yet such
declarations are not admissible to contradict the plain terms
and legal intendment of a writing governing the transaction:
Sanford v. Sanford et al. 61 Barb.
The declarations of a father, made subsequent to the execution
of deeds of land to two of his sons, and the delivery of money to
another son, and when it was not within the power of the father
to revoke or alter either of the deeds, or recover back the money,
or any part thereof, are mere hearsay, and therefore not admissible
as evidence to prove that the land was conveyed, and the money
given, as advancements: Id.
Of what took place at the time a will was drawn.-In an action
wherein the plaintiff, one of the children, and the widow of a de-
cedent are interested on one side, and the'devisees and executors
are interested on the other side, the attorney by whom the will
was drawn may be allowed to testify as to .the making of an
agreement between the testator and his wife, at the time the will
was drawn, in regard to a bequest of $10,000 to the widow being
in lieu of a proposed gift of a $5,000 note; and as to what was
said by and between the testator and his wife, and to the
witness on that subject; and that the will was drawn in con-
formity with such such agreement: Id.
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Torts--Bxecutors as such not liable for.-Case will not lie
against executors as such for damages caused by their raising the
dam on a stream, whereby the plaintifPs mill was flowed, when
the dam and the lands on which it is situated had, under the will
of their testator, become vested in the executors and others:
Plimpton v. Richards, 59 Me.
EXECUTION.
Personal Property-Officer's Sale of.-A sale on mesne process
of the personal property of -a stranger to the process, conveys no
title to the vendee; and the real owner may replevy it from the
purchaser after it has come into his possession: Coombs v. Gor-
den, 59 Me.
FENCES.
Biemoval of by Surveyor- Trespass for.-An action of trespass
cannot be maintained against a surveyor of highways for remov-
ing fences standing within the limits df the location of a highway
in his district, when their continuance has been less than forty
years next after the location of the highway: Whittier v. McIntyre,
59 Me.
•HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Criminal Law.
INSURANCE.
Marine Policy- Construction of-Latent Ambiguity.-Where
the property insured in a policy of marine insurance was de-.
scribed as "Sixty-five hundred and fifty dollars on charter,
twenty-six hundred and fifty dollars on primage, and ilso fifteen
hundred dollars on property on board ship "Charles S. Pennell,"
at and from New York to San Francisco," Held, That the phras "
"at and from New York to San Francisco," is not descriptive of
any portion of the property insured, but smply of the voyage
during which the risk was to continue: Melcher v. Ocean In-
surance Co., 59 Me.
And where it appeared that the vessel was sailing under two
charters, either of which answered the call in the policy, parol evi-
dence is admissible to prove which of the charters was insured: Id.
JUDGMENT.
Motion to set aside.-Where it appeared on a motion to set
aside a judgment, that it was for an amount exceeding $2,500 ; that
to that extent it was upon a demand for which the defendant upon
a settlement with the plaintiffs, had given them his promissory
notes, which were not due when the action was commenced. Held,
that this presented a question of law for trial. That irima facie,
this was against the right of the plaintiffs to the judgment to that
extent: Bowles et al. v. Hoare, 61 Barb.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Lease-Emblements--"Away-going" Crops--Presumption.-A
lease of a farm to a tenant, granting to him "the privilege to keep
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and harvest all the crops (in case the land is sold), which he may
have put in, and have either pay for what he may do in preparing
to put in other crops, or the privilege of putting them in and har-
vesting the same," "for the term of one year, with the privilege
of three years, if not sooner sold, from and after the first day of
April, A. D. 1866," the lease containing an agreement on thepart
of the tenant to "hire the said premises for the term of one or more
years, as above mentioned; "1 and further, that he would "not put
in more than twenty acres of wheat in any one year," will confer
upon the tenant the right to harvest a field of wheat, not more
than twenty acres, after the expiration of the lease: Brown v. Par-
sons, 22 Mich.
It is always a presumption that a lease for one year, with the
privilege of several, is to be continued on the& same terms, and
with the same rights and privileges to the tenant as during the
first year, unless some other intention is expressed: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Not guarding a roll-way with railing.-On the premises of the
defendant, within one foot of the sidewalk; of a public street, was a
descending roll-way leading to the basement of the defendant's block
of stores. The entrance to the south store, occupied by the defend-
ant's tenant as a drug store, was up four narrow steps immediately
south of the roll-way. In front of the stores north of the roll-
way was a continuous platform extending from the north end of
the block to the roll-way. The roll-way was unprovided with
railing or other safeguard except a buttress on either side thereof
rising nine inches above the level of the platform. The plaintiff
went upon the north end of the platform in the evening, and while
passing along in the exercise of ordinary care for the purpose of
entering the drug store on legitimate business, fell into the roll-
way and was injured. Held, that the place was unsafe, and the
defendant liable: Stratton v. Staples, 59 Me.
RAILROAD.
.Action for Personal injuries-Negligence-Reasonable care-
Negligence, or the want of Ordinary care, a question of Fact to
be determined by the Jury-Erroneous Instruction-Negligence
sometimes a Question of law-To entitle the plaintiff, in an action
against a railroad company, to recover damages for injuries sus-
tained by him in being caught between two cars of the defend-
ant, while he was attempting to cross a street, it must be shown
that such injuries were directly caused by the want of ordinary
care and prudence on the part of the defendant, and that they
could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care
and caution on "the part of the plaintiff: B. and 0. R. 1. Co. v.
Fitzpatrick, 35 Md.
If the plaintiff exercised reasonable care, though he may have
been guilty of some negligence or want of caution, he is still enti-
tled to recover for any injury sustained in consequence of the de-
fendant's negligence: Id.
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In an action against a railroad company, to recover damages for
injuries sustained by the paintiff in consequence of the defendant's
negligence, the question of negligence or the want of ordinary care
is one of fact for the consideration of the jury. The most that the
court can do in cases where there is a contrariety of evidence, and
the question of care or negligence depends upon the consideration
of a variety of circumstances, is to define the degree of care and
caution exacted of the parties, and leave t6 the practical judgment
and discretion of the jury the work of comparing the acts and con-
duct of the parties concerned, with what would be the natural and
ordinary course of prudent men under similar circumstances: Id.
In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in attempting to pass between
the cars of the defendant while the train was being made up on
the street, a prayer which asked the court to instruct the jury that
the plaintiff could not recover, if they believed that the defendant
left open spaces between the cars at all the regular crossings of
the street, and that the accident did not happen at a regular cross-
ing, was objectionable in that it ignored all the circumstances
tending to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, and
would have precluded the plaintiff's right of recovery, though his
injuries had been occasioned by the grossest negligence of the de-
fendant, provided they were inflicted at a place other than a regu-
lar crossing of the street: Id.
There are cases where the question of negligence may be pro-
perly one of law for the court; but such cases always present
some prominent and decisive act, not dependent upon surrounding
circumstances for its quality, and in regard to the effect and char-
acter of which no room is left for ordinary minds to differ: Id.
Whether cars, which were being placed in procession on How-
ard street, between the hours of 5 and 9 P. M., with-the purpose
of being drawn away to their regular place of destination, were in
actual service within the meaning of an ordinance of the city of
Baltimore, and therefore not required to be fastened as cars were
required to be by said ordinance, when left standing on the street
for a longer period than an hour, could only be determined by
observation as matter of fact, and was therefore a question for the
jury and not for the court: Id.
aomnwn arrier-Liablity of for Defective Platform.-A-
railroad corporation is liable to a hackman for an injry received
while carrying a passenger to their depot for .transportation, by
stepping, without fault, into a cavity in their platform, and occa-
sioned solely by the want of ordinary care on the part of the cor-
poration in leaving their platform in an unsafe condition: Tobin
v. Portland 1?ailroad Co., 59 Me.
And under such circumstances the liability is not changed by
the fact that their platform was erected and maintained by them
within the limits of the highway: Id.
98 ABSTRACTS OF RECEN T DECISION'S.
SHIPPING.
Ditties a)d powers of the Master of a Ship in a Port of neces-
sity-General average- Cotribuition-Agei cy.-The master of
a ship is the agent of the owners with power to bind them for re-
pairs to the extent of the value of the ship and freight, but not
further, unless expressly clothed with larger authority: there is
no presumption from the law of agency to justify expenditure
beyond that limit: Stirling, et al. v. Nevassa Phoslhate Com-
pany, 35 AMd.
The owner of the cargo, in a case where expenses had been
thrown upon the cargo exclusively, would have the right to call
upon the owner of the ship for contribution to the extent of the
value of the ship and freight, but not further; the master under
such circumstances being considered as acting for the benefit of
all parties interested: Id.
Whenever exigencies require the master to act for' the benefit of
other parties, to that extent his authority as agent of the ship-
owner is abridged: Id.
The master cannot do what a prudent owner, if present, would
not do, and the law will not assume that a prudent owner would
make repairs beyond the value of his vessel, when repaired: Id.
Where vessel, freight and cargo are pledged toward the repairs
of a ship by the master, and the entire proceeds of the vessel and
freight are insufficient to pay them, it is a fair presumption, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, that beyond that limit the master
was acting in behalf of the owner of the cargo: Id.
Where the cargo alone is jeopardized from causes for which the
owner of the vessel is not responsible, he is not personally ac-
countable: Id.
Where the master acts for all parties interested, the loss falls
upon the owners of the ship and cargo in proportion of their re-
spective interests: Id.
Under some circumstances, the master may act as the agent of
the owner of the cargo, independent of his agency for the owner
of the ship: Id.
SLANDER.
Examination of Witnesse.--Proof of uttering Slanderous
words-Leading.-On the examination of a witness in an action
of slander to prove the uttering of slanderous words, it is not pro-
per to read to the witness the words as laid in the declaration, and
then interrogate him concerning them ; nor it is within the discre-
tion of the circuit judge to permit such a mode of examination:
Osborn v. Forshee, 22 'dich.
Evidence-Admissions-Privileged.-The testimony given
by a witness on the trial of an action, in which he acknowledged
the uttering of certain words alleged to be slanderous, cannot be
proved as an admission, in an action against him for the alleged
slander : Id.
Declaration in slander-Colloquiwn.-No colloquium is neces-
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sary in a declaration setting forth slanderous. words, that' they
were uttered of and concerning the plaintiff, when the declaration
avers that they were uttered of, and to, the plaintiff: Id.
STAMP.
Chattel Mortgage with Sealed Writing on Back- Construction of.
Unstamped Instrument-When not Invalid.-In January, 1869,
McNeill and Swett gave the plaintiff their note secured by a mort-
gage of all the stock in trade, in the store occupied by the mort-
gagors on Point street, in Calais; "also, any and all additions
that may, from time to time, be made to said stock by" the mort-
gagors. In Mqy, 1869, the unsold original stock, together with
additions theretofore made and remaining unsold, was removed to
another store by the mortgagors, who executed under their hands
iand seals on the back of the mortgage a writing duly recorded,
therein agreeing that the "mortgage, with this indorsement there-
on, shall cover the portion of said stock removed, the same as
though it had remained in the former store, and that it shall hold
and cover -any and all additions that have been or may be made
to the same, as though the stock had remained and been put into
the former store." In trespass by the mortgagee, against an officer
for attaching the goods in July, 1869, as the property of the mort-
gagors, Held, that the mortgage, with the indorsement thereon,
gave to the plaintiff a title to the stock in the second store at the
time of the indorsement: Brown v. Thompson, 59 Me.
To authorize the court to declare an unstamped recorded in-
dorsement on a chattel mortgage to be "invalid and of no effect,"
it must affirmatively appear that the omission of the stamp was
the result of an attempt to evade the statute : Id.
SuRETY.
Discharge of,-A procured for his own accommodationthe accep-
tance of B, by giving the latter his promisorynote, withthe defend-
ant as surety, as collateral security; a month before the accept-
ance became due, A procured another acceptance of B, which he had
discounted,- and with the avails thereof and other money paid-the
former acceptance. Held, That the surety was thereby discharged:
Thomas v. Stetson, 29 Me.
It seems, that a renewal of the acceptance in such -a case, with-
out the consent of the surety, is such an extension of time of pay-
ment as releases the surety: Id.
TuEsPAss.
Trespass quare clausum-Measure of damages-C-:-ertainty-
Experts-Pasturage-Cattle-Home or distant market.-A
plaintiff in trespass will not be denied the right to recover the
actual damages he has suffered because their nature is such that
they cannot be accurately measured; and when from the nature
of the case adequate damages cannot be measured with certainty
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by a fixed rule, all facts and circumstances tending to show such
damages as are claimed in the deelaration, or their probable
amount, should be submitted to the jury, to enable them to form,
under proper instructions from the court, such reasonable and
probable estimate as in the exercise of good sense and sound
judgment they shall think will produce adequate compensation.
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, cited and approved: Gilbert
v. Kennedy, 22 Mich.
Where the plaintiff was deprived of the profitable use of his
own pasture for his own stock, by the tortious conduct of the de-
fendant in turning in his cattle with the plaintiff's, and in conse-
quence of the overfeeding of the pasture the plaintiffs cattle
suffered, the damages to which the -plaintiff will be entitled will
not be merely the value of pasturage in the vicinity, but the
value of the growth and increase in weight which the cattle
might reasonably have been expected to attain but for the over-
feeding caused by the trespass; and to show this the testimony
of farmers, graziers and drovers, having experience of cattle and
that mode of feeding, is competent. It would also be competent
to show the market value of the stock in the vicinity but for the
overfeeding, and what was the reduced value in the same market
in consequence of the overfeeding; and the difference in price, per
head and per pound, in cattle of different weights and conditions.
The value in a distant market could only be shown so far as it
tended. to control the home market; tlhe measure of damages
being what the cattle would have been worth but for the injury
to the pasture by the trespass, and the reduced amount caused
by the injury, to be estimated up to and at the time of bringing
the action-unless the cattle had been sold prior to that day-
then at the date of the sale: Id.
When a party, having been tortiously deprived of his pasturage
for his cttle, is obliged to pasture them on his meadow, the
measure of damages will be what the value of the use of the
meadow land would have been to him as meadow, not what he
could have obtained for it for pasturage: Id.
Damage to the plaintiff's cattle resulting from a loss of feed oc-
casioned by the tortious occupation of plaintiff's pasture by de-
fendant's cattle is not included in the damage to the pasture
caused by such occupation; and the condition of the pasture, its
value as such for future use, at the time I of the commencement
of the action, are proper subjects of inquiry in estimating damages
which had then been sustained: Id.
The rule that a party aggrieved by a trespass will not be
allowed to recover damages resulting from his neglect to employ
the obvious and ordinary means of preventing or lessening them,
is simply one of good faith and fair dealing; it will not prevent
his recovering for such damages as he may have actually suf-
fered, and which could not have been by reasonable diligence
averted: Id.
